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DAOISM AS CRITICAL THEORY
MARIO WENNING

ABSTRACT: Classical philosophical Daoism as it is expressed in the Dao-De-Jing and
the Zhuang-Zi is often interpreted as lacking a capacity for critique and resistance. Since
these capacities are taken to be central components of Enlightenment reason and action, it
would follow that Daoism is incompatible with Enlightenment. This interpretation is being
refuted by way of developing a constructive dialogue between the enlightenment traditions of
critical theory and recent philosophy of action from a Daoist perspective. Daoism's
normative naturalism does neither rest on a primitivist call for a return to the past, nor does
it suggest future-directed activism. By way of reconstructing its descriptive, explanatory and
emancipatory dimensions, it is shown that Daoism constitutes an alternative form of critical
theory. In contrast to future-directed purposive action or blind rule-following, Daoism's key
normative concept of "wu-wei" emphasizes effortless non-calculative responsiveness in the
present. Drawing on recent insights in the philosophy of action, a reconstruction of wu-wei
allows to conceive of a promising form of emancipatory agency.
Keywords: Daoism, critical theory, wu-wei, instrumental action, effortlessness, temporality
of action

1. INTRODUCTION
The legend of the origin of the proto-Daoist text Dao-De-Jing (道德經) dates back to
the historian Sima Qian (145-85 BC). It is likely to be more fiction than fact.1
However, even though the legend remains historically unverifiable, it is nevertheless
important to recount since it has given rise to a philosophically rich effective history.
Daoist philosophy is said to rest on an act of exchange. The sage Lao Zi was
determined to leave the middle kingdom after a long and, despite dissatisfaction with
the norms of his day, saturated life. He approached the Western border of the
kingdom of Zhou where he encountered Yin Xi, who was the ancient version of a
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customs and border control officer. Yin Xi asked Lao Zi to pay his dues. Since the
sage was not an affluent man and did not possess anything dispensable, he was
politely asked to pay for his passage by writing down what he had discovered during
his philosophical wayfaring. After giving in to the request, Lao Zi left the kingdom to
move West where he died much later at the magnificent age of 160. According to this
legend, it is thus only by accident, or, to be more precise, through a generous act of
exchanging the right of passage for the codification of Daoist philosophy, that the
5000 words divided into the 81 chapters we know under the title of Dao-De-Jing have
been passed down to us.
During his exile from Nazi Germany, the Marxist poet Bertholt Brecht carried a
painting depicting the scene of Lao Zi riding a water buffalo towards the border with
him. Brecht's captivating poem from 1938 about the ―Legend of the Origin of the
Book Dao-De-Jing on Lao Zi's Road into Exile‖ was circulated widely among those
persecuted by totalitarian regimes. The poem sparked a sense of hope in the midst of
historical catastrophe. Did Brecht's adaptation of the legend simply present an
unwarranted and sufficiently exotic consolation for the victims of an atrocious history
who, if they were lucky, could escape, or does it indeed contain a philosophically
significant content, an explosive message in a bottle? When the boy accompanying
Lao Zi was asked by the pragmatic gate keeper in Brecht's poem what the sage had
discovered, the boy responds: ―he learnt that soft water, by way of movement over the
years, will grind strong rocks away. In other words: that hardness succumbs.‖2
Drawing on the at the time common trope of the power of water to overcome the
seemingly greatest of obstacles,3 what Brecht's border-crosser Lao Zi had discovered
was an understanding of what could be called ―liquid resistance.‖ In contrast to firm
materials, formless water does not overcome obstacles by way of direct confrontation,
but through seemingly unintended, effortless and unpredictable processes of
emulation and changing course whenever necessary. Rather than provoking resistance
through acts of direct engagement, water is efficacious in overcoming obstacles by
way of yielding and acquiescing to them. It purifies itself by standing still and finds
its way by floating to the lowest point. The captivating poem by Brecht and its
equally rich effective history poses the vexing question: what is the critical potential
of Daoist philosophy that motivated Brecht and other social critics identifying with
the fate of the most abject, degraded and precarious forms of existence to be swayed
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Bertolt Brecht (1981, 660-663). The cited quotation from stanza 5 reads in the original: „Daß das
weiche Wasser in Bewegung/ Mit der Zeit den mächtigen Stein besiegt. / Du verstehst, das Harte
unterliegt.― See also Heinrich Detering (2008).
3
The water imagery is developed in chapters 4, 7, 43 and, most extensively, in chapter 78 of the DaoDe-Jing: ―In all the world, nothing is more supple or weak than water/ Yet nothing can surpass it for
attacking what is still and strong./ And so nothing can take its place./ That the weak overcomes the
strong and the supple overcomes the hard/ These are things everyone in the world knows but none can
practice.‖ (chapter 78, 81). Sarah Allan (1997) persuasively traces the way in which water serves as a
root metaphor to illustrate the principles governing human conduct in classical, pre-Qin Chinese
philosophical traditions.
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by its message, a message that seems radically different from the typical Marxist call
to arms in the service of historical struggle for the sake of the worst-off?
Brecht's adaptation of Daoism seems all the more perplexing given the conception
of Chinese philosophy in the West. One common critique leveled against Chinese
philosophical traditions goes something like this. Rather than providing another
alternative foundation for Enlightenment reason, Confucianism and Daoism are
essentially incompatible with individual autonomy and equality, the pillars of the
Enlightenment project. The alleged deficit is then attributed to a difference in
philosophical outlook. The age of critique, announced in a tone of philosophical
audacity from the Neo-Copernican Kant, claims philosophical singularity and
superiority with regard to his East Asian contenders. While Western philosophical
traditions in the Enlightenment tradition call into question established webs of
authority, the emphasis on cosmic harmony in Confucianism and Daoism is said to
rest on an acceptance of unquestioned relationships of power. In other words,
harmony is emphasized at the expense of a capacity for individual resistance and
critique. If autonomy and equality are the pillars of enlightenment reason, the
capacity to resist is its muscle. If Daoism just gives in to established authorities, it
does not possess the capacity of resistance, thus making it unsuitable for
emancipation emphasized in the wake of the Enlightenment.
Following this line of critique, two specific strains of objections against Daoism's
emancipatory potential and enlightenment deficit thus need to be addressed up front
before discussing in what sense Daoism can be interpreted as a critical theory. One
line of critique is addressed at Daoism's primitivist naturalism while the other set of
objections focuses on the proposed technique of emulation. The first group of critics
conceives of Daoism as a reactionary movement propagating a return to nature. Such
movements claim that the present is fallen when compared to an allegedly earlier,
blissful state in need of being restored once again. The emulation of a constantly
changing yet static environment envisioned by Daoists is criticized as a form of
imitation of, or a call for a return to, a primary state of nature. The natural world is
being romanticized, critics contend, as idyllic and ethically superior. This line of
critique, clearly mirroring Christian conceptions of a myth of the primal fall as one
finds them in Western romanticism, hardly does justice to the gist of the normative
ideals we find in the oldest Daoist texts. Rather than advocating a return to a
simplicity that allegedly existed in some prior historical period, Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi
draw on what they describe as "natural" processes in order to delineate structures of
present flourishing in the midst of "historical" crises. Nature is not what happened
prior to the fall from paradise to civilization, but the spontaneity which is ever again
threatened to be covered up by webs of social domination and misguided authority.
That the pervasive reference to nature in Daoist texts is not the kind of naturalism
the first group of critics take it to be becomes clear if we turn to the first readers of
the classical Daoists who stressed that emulation is not to be misunderstood as
imitation. Guo Xiang already emphasized in his commentary on the Zhuang-Zi (莊子)
that blind imitation of an allegedly natural condition is useless, fruitless and harmful.
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Imitation is useless because the world is in constant flux and different times require
different responses. Imitation is also fruitless since the very act of imitation
presupposes a conscious effort, which stands in the way of achieving the naturalness
that is being attributed to what is being imitated. And, finally, imitation is said to be
harmful in that it manifests a constant striving to overcome one's limits. This
overcoming rather than acknowledging stands in the way of optimal, we could also
say, non-reified practices of self- other- and world-relationships.4 The term ‗zi-ran‘
(自然), which is translated as ‗natural‘, offers itself as a denominator for such
processes of spontaneous flourishing. Just as optimal forms of action seem to be
performed as if by themselves and without an ulterior end, nature also is not equipped
with a fixed trajectory while revealing a sense of flourishing and fittingness. The
reference to naturalness serves as a critique against artificial forms of ―second nature‖
in the form of reified conceptions of morality and straining activism.
In the case of an occasional reference to an allegedly better past, for example to
the utopian village in chapter 80 of the Dao-De-Jing, what is depicted is not a
historical past of perfected human beings who live in harmony with nature. Rather,
the images serve as mythic or utopian evocations of a mode of being and powerexecution which is significantly different and more sophisticated than that found in
societies which use up all resources in acts of instrumental activism.5 In the case of
the utopian village, what is depicted is not a primitive community before the fall. The
city possesses tools such as ships and carts, armor and weapons, but they ―have no
reason to deploy them.‖6 This city consists a group of people, which is
technologically highly advanced while preserving the freedom to not use the
technology at its disposal, to live a decelerated life in the present while leaving the
technological choices at their disposal unused whenever their application is not
absolutely necessary. They live in relatively small communities in order not to be
governed by a distant government they do not have an obvious connection to. The
imagination is used here as a laboratory to provide impulses in order to enrich
conceptions of chosen, communal and sophisticated passivity in the present rather
than primitive innocence or unreflective activism directed at the future.
Apart from the charge of primitive naturalism, a second, perhaps more forceful
strain of objections against Daoism's critical potential concerns what is seen as the
opportunistic strategy or set of techniques arising out of the ethics of emulation.
While the first group of critics object to Daoism's alleged primitivism, the second
group object to the proposed forms of emulation. This second strain of objections
contends that Daoism essentially reconciles actors to the pathological structures of
their age rather than empowering them to understand, oppose and, ultimately,
transform or abolish these structures. This critique reflects a long tradition of
4

Fung Yu-Lan (1976, 226-227).
Viktor Kalinke (1999, 90) writes, ―it is apparent that the emphasis of what has been does not aim at
an objective historiography, but at the decelleration (Verzögerung) of action. A reflection and
comparison with what is comparable is being called for. It has a psychological function, which is
expressed in the German word 'nachdenken' (re-membering or after-thought)‖.
6
Dao-De-Jing, trans. Ivanhoe (chapter 81).
5
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accusing Daoism of promoting a problematic form of quietism. Rather than resisting
problematic processes of change, they are said to accept these phenomena as
unchangeable. The best one can do, Daoists seem to suggest, is to use what is
problematic but here to stay to one's advantage. The enfent terrible of contemporary
philosophy Slavoi Zizek puts it as follows:
The recourse to Taoism or Buddhism offers a way out of this predicament which
definitely work better than the desperate escape into old traditions: instead of trying to
cope with the accelerating rhythm of the technological progress and social changes, one
should rather renounce the very endeavor to retain control over what goes on, rejecting it
as the expression of the modern logic of domination - one should, instead, ―let oneself
go,‖ drift along, while retaining an inner distance and indifference towards the mad dance
of the accelerated process, a distance based on the insight that all this social and
technological upheaval is ultimately just a non-substantial proliferation of semblances
which do not really concern the innermost kernel of our being... One is almost tempted to
resuscitate here the old infamous Marxist cliché of religion as the ―opium of the people,‖
as the imaginary supplement of the terrestrial misery: the ―Western Buddhist‖ meditative
stance is arguably the most efficient way, for us, to fully participate in the capitalist
dynamics, while retaining the appearance of mental sanity. If Max Weber were to live
today, he would definitely write a second, supplementary, volume to his Protestant Ethic,
entitled The Taoist Ethic and the Spirit of the Global Capitalism.7

While Zizek agrees that Daoism is not a form of primitivist romanticism, he argues
that contemporary appropriations of Eastern thought, in particular Daoism, are a
psychic symptom of neoliberal capitalism rather than promising conceptual and
practical tools to understand and transform it. Rather than coming to terms with the
accelerating logic of late modern societies, Daoist patterns of action, on Zizek's
account, at best help to wander at ease within these pathological structures. They keep
up the illusion of equanimous mental sanity in the midst of catastrophic madness.
Just as the charge against Daoism‘s alleged primitivism, Zizek's interpretation
seems mistaken to me. It might be a legitimate response to certain ―Eurodaoist‖8
forms of lifestyle philosophies and new age wisdom literature propagating that a
spiritual change will automatically lead to a transformation of the environing system
parameters. What the objection fails to acknowledge and do justice to, though, is the
emancipatory impulse behind Daoism. Rather than opposing one's changing
environment with outdated images of bliss, by emulating this environment in
constantly readjusting ways like a river adjusts its course, actors reclaim naturalness
in their action and become empowered. Such an empowerment does not proceed by
mastering the world through one's purposive efforts, but emancipates itself by

7

Slavoi Zizek (2001). Zizek missed the fact that Max Weber (1989) did indeed write a second less
known sequel to the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism in which he explicitly addresses
Confucianism and the heterodox dimensions of Daoism while arguing for their responsibility for the
precarious condition of China around the turn to the 20 th century.
8
Peter Sloterdijk (1989).
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responding to the environment in the form of adjusting to dynamic processes in
refined and often subversive ways.
Perhaps the most prominent and promising critical concept of Daoism is the
guiding conceptual metaphor of wu-wei (無爲). It captures what this liquid resistance
means in terms of concrete actions. Wu-wei is commonly translated as ―non-doing‖ or
―non-action‖. Following Liu Xiaogan, we can say that ―naturalness is the core value
of the thought of Lao Zi, while wu-wei is the principle or method for realizing this
value in action.‖9 This essential action-theoretical concept fills an important lacuna in
contemporary critical theory. A charitable reconstruction could be immensely
productive in contemporary debates in critical theory and the philosophy of action
developed in the contemporary analytic and continental traditions.10 Such a
reconstruction would free philosophical Daoism from its alleged enlightenment
deficit.
Even a cursory look at the writings of the classical Daoists Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi
suffices to reveal their emancipatory potential. Due to their hermeneutic openness,
Daoist sources have been interpreted at different times as primitivism, religious
mysticism, military strategy, advice to emperors, manuals for religious initiation and
self-cultivation, normative and epistemic relativism, precursors of postmodernism,
anarchism, linguistic skepticism or simply as a collection of incoherent poetic sayings
which defy the systematizing and rigorous logic common to mainstream
contemporary philosophy.11 In what follows I would like to add one more reading and
suggest that the spirit of Daoism is captured best when it is understood as a form of
critical theory. Daoists propose a different enlightenment and a different critical
theory, thereby presenting us with what Bert Brecht called a device of bringing forth
a defamiliarization and estrangement (Verfremdungseffekt). This interpretative
hypothesis can serve as a prolegomena to a future research project. To make such a
project not only plausible but also fruitful, I would like to show that Daoism,
understood as a distinctly other form of critical theory, is capable of providing
impulses that could be taken up in addressing one of the most pressing issues facing
critical theorists today.
Daoism, I argue, can be helpful in conceiving of a form of non-instrumental
action and reawaken a sense of potentiality, which helps to uncover a blind spot at the
basis of conceptions of time and action as we find it in contemporary critical
philosophy. A charitable reinterpretation of the Daoist concept of wu-wei allows us to
9

Xiaogan Liu (1999, 211).
Edward Slingerland (2006) interprets the conception of wu-wei understood as effortless action. It
might be argued that certain theories of action in the European canon point into similar directions.
Aristotle's conception of praxis, for example, and its reception by Hannah Arendt and others come to
mind. I will show at a different occasion that these conceptions retain the temporal framework
governing purposive actions, motivating a more radical break such as the one provided by an updated
account of Daoist effortless action.
11
For a detailed account of the history of Daoism see Livia Kohn (2000), as well as Russell Kirkland
(2004). For a systematic introduction see Hans-Georg Möller (2001).
10
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conceive of a form of practical reason and action, which embodies a promising
alternative to instrumental rationality. A reorientation of critique resulting from a
constructive engagement with Daoism would have to arise out of an acknowledgment
that one of the underlying ideologies of modernity consists precisely in a problematic
preoccupation with either the past or the future at the expense of acknowledging
perfecting forms of effortless action as they reveal themselves in the present. To make
this claim intelligible it is necessary to call to mind the basic structure of critical
theory.
2. THE THREEFOLD STRUCTURE OF CRITICAL THEORY
First, it is necessary to outline what is meant by ―critical theory‖ before pursuing the
question whether, and in what sense, Daoism can legitimately be understood as
another critical theory. Critical theory usually combines diagnostic, explanatory and
emancipatory dimensions. In analyzing societies in times of crises and destitution,
deeply seated pathologies are uncovered. These range from exploitation of
underprivileged strata of the population and consumerism to the environmental and
social costs of neoliberal market economies. Not only are these pathologies revealed,
but their root causes and social functions are also being traced and, if possible, means
of practically overcoming them are pointed out.
Pathologies are social and psychological deformations on a structural level
manifesting themselves in social institutions, individual patterns of beliefs,
motivations and practices. The pathologies which critical theory has been diagnosing
can be summarized, following Marx, Lukacs and Weber, as a combination of
reification, disenchantment and acceleration. In the process of increasingly
understanding intersubjective-, self- and world-relationships primarily from the
perspective of exchanging equivalent commodities on a market governed
increasingly, and sometimes exclusively, by a competition for these commodities,
individuals become systematically estranged from the objects they produce, the
process of production, themselves, and from the community of fellow human
beings.12
The pathology of reification (Verdinglichung) arising from the exchange principle
governing ever more dimensions of society has been analyzed, drawing on the early
Marx and Lukacs, from a variety of perspectives.13 Originally reification referred to
the process of making singular human beings and experiences similar and
exchangeable by abstracting from their unique qualities. While the concept seemed
outdated for a long time due to its implicit assumption of a human essence from
which one could become estranged, it made an astonishing comeback. Whether it is a
critique of the reification/distortion of communication,14 the reification of
relationships of intersubjective recognition,15 the reification of gender roles16 or the
12

Karl Marx (1973, 108-111).
See for example Axel Honneth, (2005).
14
Jürgen Habermas (1984).
15
Axel Honneth (1996).
13
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reification of conceptions of the self,17 what is being criticized are relationships
primarily controlled by a fixed logic of instrumental reason and strategic bargaining
processes rather than mutual understanding, recognition, care for the self, love and
other preconditions of leading a good life within the constraints of justice.
Apart from the attempts to shed light on reification as a major form of pathology
in modern societies, it is a significant success of recent work in critical social theory
to emphasize that not all pathologies of modernity can be reduced to intersubjective
pathologies of communication and reification.18 People in late modern societies do
not just suffer from being used rather than understood or being invisible rather than
recognized. They also suffer from what Max Weber called ‗disenchantment‘
(Entzauberung). In the process of increased rationalization, traditional sources of
meaning that were sedimented in inherited religious traditions, social institutions and
customs have lost their power in orienting lives.
Finally, the process that reification and the vanishing of resources of meaning
have been engaged in is one of an increasing acceleration (Beschleunigung) in which,
as Marx puts it, ―everything that is solid melts into the air‖. We witness a
progressively increasing speed not only of technological innovation, but of social
change since the late medieval period. While there was an intergenerational speed of
change in the early modern period, and a generational speed of change during
classical and high modernity, late modernity is characterized by an intragenerational
speed of change in which the basic parameters of coordinating one‘s life change
within a lifetime. In this latest stage of acceleration, the only thing that is certain is
that what was taken to be certain today might not be certain tomorrow.19 This
acceleration is both subjectively experienced and corresponds to objective modes of
accelerated life ranging from processing information, the transportation of goods and
people, voting behavior to the change of significant others and professions. Increased
change of environments and values undermines traditional forms of identity
formation since actors are forced to constantly reassess and readjust their forms of
life, practices and sets of convictions.
All three pathologies constitute forms of social injury. While the psychological
impact of reification leads to systematic forms of forced inclusion or exclusion, of
being restricted to or being left out of fixed identities, and the process of
disenchantment corresponds to a sense of existential absurdity in a world devoid of
binding resources of meaning, the pressures of increasing acceleration are
experienced in terms of existential exhaustion and anxiety. As a consequence, there is
an increased sense of superfluousness and being antiquated, a fear to be left behind in,
or fall outside of the rushing hamster's wheel of late modern societies.
However distinct these pathologies might appear, it is crucial to notice that there
is a close linkage between these three briefly outlined pathological tendencies of
modern societies. Not only are reification, disenchantment and acceleration
16

Judith Butler (1999).
Michel Foucault (1977).
18
See J.M. Bernstein (2001); Nikolas Kompridis (2006).
19
Hartmut Rosa, (2005, chapter 5).
17
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historically connected, they also imply each other on a conceptual level. Reification
consists in seeing the world primarily from the vantage point of being a means or a
toolbox from which means can be utilized in order to bring about a desired end. In
this objectifying process, the end justifies the variable means and is the only factor
taken to be intrinsically valuable. This end, then, is understood as not presently
realized but as a future possibility the reality of which depends on the implementation
of one's plan of action. Bernard Williams, the eminent British moral philosopher,
stresses this point by arguing that without projecting an aim into the future, life would
become meaningless. He argues for ―the idea of a man's ground projects providing
the motive force which propels him into the future, and gives him a reason for
living.‖20 If it were the case that our very existence would be safeguarded only as
long as we intentionally pursue future-directed goals and projects in increasingly
rationalized ways, it would mean that actors would be doomed to be increasingly
alienated from a present they could at best regard as offering instrumentally useful,
but intrinsically insignificant means for a supposedly meaningful future. Seen from
the temporal horizon of the actor engaged in instrumental reasoning and action, the
present events, actions, objects and subjects lack any intrinsic value. They are
regarded as merely ―useful for‖ certain projects rather than significant in virtue of
what they are. The moment a project is realized, the satisfaction vanishes since it is
not futural anymore. By presupposing such a restricted conception of projective
action as the reason for living, the present environment an actor navigates in is
transformed into pure immanence in which prediction becomes possible to the point
of resembling an analytic judgment: assuming that we know what we want, and if we
can do what we want while nobody keeps us from doing it, what we want will
become realized. Novelty is being reduced to the discovery of new implications of
what has already been familiar. Effort is generated once we see the end of our action
as external to our spontaneously generated attachments. It grows out of the attempt to
realize the stipulated end in ever more innovative, efficient and predictable ways in
which spontaneity is, at best, forced towards a goal. The goal at which effort is
directed often drops out of focus during the acceleration process or it loses its appeal.
It seems external to the actor who has been trapped in a means-ends apparatus. This
rationalization process increasingly becomes independent from the specificity of ends
pursued and impossible to get out of. With every rationalized act the actor moves
deeper into the quicksand of a world of suppressed spontaneity.
The consequence of this seemingly autonomous rationalization process famously
described by Weber as an ―iron cage‖ is that the present is being downgraded as
insignificant on its own terms when compared to the future gains one promises
oneself as the payoff of one's actions. Processes of innovation become the norm and
speed up because actors hope to do and achieve ever more goals in increasingly
20

Bernard Williams (1982, 13). Harry Frankfurt objects to Williams on this point by arguing that ―our
interest in living does not commonly depend upon our having projects that we desire to pursue. It's the
other way around: we are interested in having worthwhile projects because we do intend to go on
living, and we would prefer not to be bored.‖ Taking Ourselves Seriously & Getting it Right (2006, 3637).
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shorter segments of emptied time. Actors rush to a future, which can in principle
never be actualized. Paul Virillio fittingly describes this blind acceleration process of
chasing structurally elusive future goals in increasingly higher speeds of innovation
adequately as a ―rushing standstill‖. From within the ―iron cage‖ of modernity true
innovation, which would have to be different from mere acceleration or enhancement
and would require deliberating about alternative present ends, seems increasingly
impossible.21 The new is transfigured into the only variable that is to be expected.
Instrumental action as the reified forgetfulness of the meaning resources of the
present for the sake of the projected future thus seems without alternative. The
consequence is what Hermann Lübbe refers to as a ‗Gegenwartsschrumpfung‘, a
continuing shrinking of the present under the complimentary pressures of the
tendencies of melancholic musealization of irretrievably lost pasts and forced
innovation to run after structurally elusive futures.22
The dilemma with which critical theorists see themselves confronted is that
whatever emancipatory tendencies – be they introduced as forms of resistance, mutual
understanding, recognition etc. – are being proposed as means for a future end,
instrumental action is reenacted under a normative guise and the domination of the
future over the rest of time is thus further sedimented. As soon as instrumental actors
propose or just point to emancipatory forms of action, they replicate and reenact the
same temporal logic that it originally diagnosed as the problem of modernity, i.e., the
belief that the future can be mastered through acts of projective planning. The
problem of this projective planning mentality is not that things often turn out
differently than planned, but that the actor sidesteps and thereby undermines the
significance of the present and sees it simply as something to be used for future ends.
In other words, by downgrading the present including its modes of action to being
"for the sake of the future," critical theory denigrates the present to the status of a prefuture, a state of emptiness that is used as a resource rather than lived in.
A theory exposing and explaining social pathologies is keen on pointing to the
inescapable mechanisms preventing the emancipatory use of reason through action.
Such an exclusive focus on the diagnosis and emergence of pathologies coincides
with developing an ethics of melancholy that emphasizes the inescapable specter of
instrumental reason. Looking back in a melancholy state of mind over the long
history of failed revolutions, it only sees what has been irretrievably lost in the wake
of histories of catastrophes.23 The present is now seen as an appendix to a past larger
than life, an after-past. By replacing the search for an alternative mode of present
potentiality with a focus on the traumatic experiences of history, it forecloses the
possibility of emancipatory action in the present and thereby reverses the temporal
logic of modernity. By replacing the infatuation of the projected future over the
present, a new domination – that of the past over the present – is being introduced and
sedimented. While the former domination – that of the future over the present 21

Paul Virillio (1999).
Hermann Lübbe (1994).
23
Gillian Rose (1979); Gregg M. Horowitz (2001).
22
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corresponded to forms of blind activism, the latter – that of the past over the present leads to a state of passivity, an inhibition, which replaces the engagement with the
present for the contemplation of mnemonic art. The consequence is not a liberation of
the past (which is in principle impossible) or a liberation of the present, but an
extension of the temporal pressure put on the present. While the classical modernists
only had to justify themselves with respect to the future, late modernists also have to
justify themselves with respect to the past.
This detour was intended to show that the instrumental actor finds himself in a
dilemma that seems impossible to get out off. The shrinking of the present arising out
of instrumental action constitutes a theoretical as well as practical impasse. A
transcultural engagement with Daoism understood as another critical theory could
turn out to be fruitful given that it emerged within a cultural context in which
instrumental action has not been the only or even primary form of action. First,
however, it needs to be asked whether it is at all legitimate to interpret Daoism as
another critical theory.
3. DAOISM AS ANOTHER CRITICAL THEORY
In the second part of the paper I will first show that Daoism can be understood as a
critical theory and then discuss whether it offers an insight that could overcome the
uneasy relationship between critical theory and emancipatory action with a focus on
the present. The goal is to show that the proto-Daoists Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi,
commonly referred to as "Lao-Zhuang", provide a promising path which points to an
alternative approach of addressing the vexing problem of instrumental action
expressing itself in the pathologies of reification, disenchantment and acceleration. At
the risk of engaging in anachronistic hermeneutics by applying texts from a different
tradition which date back two and a half-millennia, the benefits of tapping rich
conceptual sources providing a new insight into entrenched philosophical
preconceptions seem overwhelming. Compared to European traditions, Daoism's long
history of addressing phenomena of reification and change in theoretical, as well as
practical ways, provides an immense richness not only for a reorientation of critical
theory, but also in terms of envisioning emancipatory practices. The insight into the
fluidity of social dynamics and the fluid subjectivity of actors anticipates many of the
developments of late modern societies. At the same time Daoism offers us correctives
to these developments. The early Daoist acknowledgment of the value of idling and
uselessness, for example, allows us to level a critique of the pathologies of reification,
disenchantment and acceleration deriving from a reduction of action to instrumental
action. A critical theory in the spirit of Daoism would not simply disclose
pathologies. It would also offer constructive resources which allow us to critically
address and, as far as possible, overcome these pathologies without providing yet
another reifying project that sells out on the potentiality of the present for the sake of
the future.
Before focusing on how Daoism could help to address the connection between
suffering from reification, disenchantment and acceleration, let us first step back and

Comparative Philosophy 2.2 (2011)

WENNING

61

consider the all but self-evident proposal to conceive of Daoism as a form of critical
theory. I will only briefly mention the diagnostic and explanatory dimensions for the
reasons that they are the weakest and least developed parts in Daoist thinking, while
the emancipatory dimension offers a way to address the question concerning the
difficulty arising from the attempt to overcome instrumental rationality without
replicating its underlying temporal logic.
First, Daoism is critical in the most obvious and widely acknowledged sense in
that it presents a response to the destitution of China during the late Zhou dynasty in
which war and social disintegration threatened the stability of society. 24 Apart from
this historical reason, exposing certain parallels with today's crises-ridden global
order, both Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi are critical of the philosophical attempts to address
this destitution, especially the attempt of Confucius and his successor, Mencius.
Whereas Confucius and his followers propagated the cultivation of the virtuous
human being with the goal of integrating him or her into a hierarchically ordered
social organism through the subjection to principles of love and filial piety, the
Daoists pursued a conscious retreat from commonly accepted social norms and
rejected the starting point of normative theory understood as outlining universal,
context-independent principles of social obligation and cultivation more generally:
―Filial piety, brotherliness, benevolence, righteousness, loyalty, trust, honor,
integrity-for all of these you must drive yourself and make a slave of Virtue.‖25 While
the Confucians aim at cultivating the individual to fulfill the duties springing from his
or her fixed position in the web of social relationships, the Daoists propagate an
unlearning process with the indirect goal of interrupting webs of social integration,
including the desire for social recognition, for the sake of cultivating spontaneity. The
individual is strengthened in his or her capacity to resist with regard to commonly
accepted values of the community. However, the liquid, readjusting self propagated
by Daoism is not an autonomous, deliberative firm subject commonly known in the
Western philosophical traditions. Rather, it is a flexible or liquid self, which refuses
to adhere to context-independent moral principles while responding to its
environment in emancipatory ways.26
By focusing on outlining context-independent moral obligations, Confucian
benevolence only addresses the pathologies of the age at the surface level, while
leaving the deeper causes of alienation from the dao, the patterns of spontaneous
flourishing, untouched: ―When the great Way is abandoned, there are benevolence
and righteousness. When wisdom and intelligence come forth, there is great
hypocrisy. When the six familial relationships are out of balance, there are kind
parents and filial children. When the state is in turmoil and chaos, there are loyal
ministers.‖27 As a form of proto-ideology critique, Daoism thus reveals how moral
systems of belief serve as justifications of the underlying pathological practices rather
24
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The ―postmodern‖ conception of such a liquid self is seen primarily as a problem rather than a
potential by Bauman (2006) and Sennett (1998).
27
Dao-De-Jing (2002, chapter 18).
25

Comparative Philosophy 2.2 (2011)

WENNING

62

than adequately addressing and, wherever possible, transforming them. The point
made by Daoists is that it is not helpful to change the moral convictions of the time as
long as one does not also change the underlying practices.
In the earlier analysis of the logic of instrumental action we have seen that by way
of trying to master the present for the sake of a future project, the openness of the
present is closed and the present shrinks. Constant innovation becomes a means in
order to desperately try to gather more experiences and rush after fugitive goals in
every shorter time spans. Critical theory has been incapable of addressing the
pathology of acceleration in theoretically plausible and practically promising ways by
failing to see through the temporal structure underlying instrumental, purposive
action. This becomes particularly obvious when we turn to the third dimension of a
critical social theory, that of opening up or at least pointing to transformative
dimensions. In order to distance itself from the norms prevalent in the society, critical
theory in a Daoist spirit has to point to something that is not only significantly
different, but also significantly better. Only when it is possible to disclose
possibilities that promise to overcome or at least significantly ameliorate the
diagnosed pathologies as forms of social injury are we dealing with a progressive
rather than reactionary force. The emancipatory dimension distinguishes mere
cultural critique from critical theory.
In what way, then, does a reconstruction of Daoist conception of the relationship
between optimal action and time point towards a transformative potential in the
present? A charitable reconstruction of the concept of wu-wei would, without doubt,
have to abandon certain metaphysical background assumptions common to ancient
Daoism. In particular it is necessary to dismiss the cosmological conception of a basic
harmony of the cosmos as well as the possibility of retreating from societies,
including the norms governing these societies. It is not plausible to assume that the
moderns have simply lost the right path or dao, because this would presuppose that
there once was or always is a right path one could be led astray from. Rather, we
might say metaphorically that the dao itself has become astray to express that social
structures take on pathological forms. In other words, many of the pathologies of late
modern societies are not directly to be attributed to the decisions of individual actors
but are structural dimensions governing all spheres of society as much as theses
spheres are only reproduced through human action. Actors cannot simply leave
behind an unhealthy for a healthy dao, but have to uncover dimensions within dao,
dimensions pointing to forms of actions, which allow for flourishing and
transformation from within. Given these ramifications, a charitable interpretation of
wu-wei could provide valuable insights for contemporary action theory in the context
of critical social theory. I have suggested that wu-wei, understood as pertaining to the
form of an action performed in an effortless way, provides a radically different
conception of optimal action from that of purposive, instrumental activity.
As a key normative concept, wu-wei could perhaps be better translated as,
following Ames and Hall, ―non-coercive action‖ or, following Eric Sean Nelson, as
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―effortless non-calculative responsiveness‖28 to avoid the passive and quietist
implications associated with the literal translation ―non-action‖ or ―non-doing‖.29
Since the term appears in many different contexts and different texts, it can at best
serve as an umbrella concept covering a potentially unlimited set of practices, which
have some things in common and diverge in other dimensions. It is fair to say that
due to its high valuation in classical Chinese texts, activities or forms of
responsiveness referred to as displaying the structure of wu-wei present an
achievement. They are optimal forms of comportment. While they can be cultivated,
they don't follow the same means-end rationality which reduces the means to be only
instrumentally useful and has a tendency to wear subjects out in accelerating
processes of a forgetfulness of the present.
It has been argued by Chris Fraser, among others, that it is misleading to conceive
of wu-wei as a form of effortless action and that it would be better to interpret it as
non-intentional action instead.30 To understand why it is nevertheless justified to
understand wu-wei as involving effortless dimensions rather than focusing on nonintentionality it is essential to distinguish two different senses of effort. This will
allow us to avoid the misunderstanding that wu-wei would be an irrational, nonpurposive state of simply letting oneself go without conscious focus. Wu-wei
interrupts a certain form of effortful striving. When referring to effort, we often
conflate objective effort with subjectively experienced effort. While the former
includes the exercise of physiological processes (physical effort) as well as thought
processes (mental effort), the latter refers to the subjective feeling of exertion and
exhaustion.31 When translating wu-wei as a form of ―effortless non-calculative
responsiveness‖ (rather than nonintentional action), what is meant is not the absence
of objective effort, but a decreasing amount of subjectively experienced
strenuousness. Such forms of performing an action without exhausting oneself
coincide with the deliberate and often skilled performance of a practice. Often
28
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effortless actions tend to coincide precisely with an increased form of identification
with highly complex forms of skilled action ranging from playing chess and juggling
to speaking a natural language fluently. These actions are intentional in the sense that
when being asked why an actor engages in them, he could provide a reason for his
action as an answer.32 However, when wu-wei-like actions are conducted well, the
consciousness of these reasons and especially the conscious fixation on future goals,
which needs to be actualized through significant degrees of subjectively felt
exhaustion, drops out of the field of experience of the actor.
One classic example to illustrate the structure of wu-wei-like actions is the story
of cook Ding mentioned in Zhuang-Zi. The cook perfected the skill of cutting up oxen
by learning how to use a knife with the greatest subtlety, avoiding any unnecessary
friction. Ding did so by "using his cultivated intuition rather than his eyes" to cut up
the ox according to his joints, avoiding all unnecessary resistance and thereby
transforming an instrumental skill into an effective and context-sensitive art, an ars
contextualis.33 He perfected the art of butchery to the point of not having to blindly
follow rules in a subjectively as well as objectively (with regard to the sharpness of
the blade of the knife) exhausting way. This does not mean that cutting up the ox does
not confront the butcher with challenges. Otherwise he would not even need a knife
and would not be a master of his art. It also does not mean that Ding could not
provide reasons for what he is doing. After all, he explains his philosophy of intuitive
mastery to Lord Wen-Hui. However, when challenges arise, Ding stops for a moment
to ―size up the difficulties‖ and focuses on the activity in the present in a slow and
calm manner rather than wasting his energies in forms of overly strenuous and hasty
acts of applying a context-independent method. The story does not simply illustrate
the benefits of wu-wei-like action, but offers a normative model, which "goes beyond
skill" and, in Lord Wen-Hui‘s words, illustrates ―the secret of caring for life‖.34 This
secret, we may infer, is that the mastery of practices does not rest on analyzing or
reasoning from principles, but in spontaneously attending to a situation intuitively and
with a high degree of effortless concentration and dedication.
What is significant for our context is the specific temporality of engaging in wuwei. What the concept wu-wei designates is a perfection in the moment of present
action rather than a perfection the goal of which is being projected into the future.
The vital organ of decision making processes is the heart-mind xin (心) rather than
the disembodied intellect. ―For the ancient Chinese,‖ A.C. Graham remarks, ―the
heart, not the brain, is the organ of thought. Most men use it to plan ahead, but the
sage uses it only to reflect the situation as it objectively is, before he responds. Like a
mirror, it reflects only the present; it is not stuffed with past information which it
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‗retains‘ (ts'ang [cang 藏] ‗stores, hoards‘) at the cost of being trapped in obsolete
attitudes. The sage perceives and responds to every situation as new.‖35
Seen from a temporal perspective, wu-wei is intended to free the future-creating
presence as it discloses itself from the perspective of an actor who is pursuing his task
in a skillful and whole-hearted fashion in the ever new and newly experienced
present. The actor is fully absorbed into performing an action well to the point of
forgetting himself, the passage of time, as well as extrinsic goals of the action. It is
easy to see that an action carried out in this way is also self-rewarding while being
indirectly efficacious. The actor forgets the passage of time and is not being inhibited
by the anxiety connected to goal fixation while he might nevertheless indirectly
realize goals which are important to him. Being in a state of fully absorbed,
meaningful and skilled action includes a heightened responsiveness to the constantly
changing potential of the context surrounding the action. Rather than acting only
locally by detaching a certain task, instrument or goal from its context, the actor
mirrors the situation in its entirety. By freeing the attention for the demands of the
present moment from the weight of a recollected past and the demands of a not yet
present future, it allows an action to be spontaneous rather than being guided by a
fixed plan the goal of which is projected beyond the here and now. The actor is not
wearing himself out in the process of being plagued by a deadline attached to his
project, but exercises his energies efficiently in the mastery of the art of perfecting
action.
Based on the concept of wu-wei, a critique of the temporal logic underlying
instrumental action that is lacking in critical theory becomes possible. In contrast to
the inactivity of an apathetic person, the actor practicing wu-wei engages the present
in non-instrumental ways. Rather than limiting non-instrumental action to the
aesthetic realm as has been common in the European tradition from Schiller until
Adorno or that of intersubjectivity as in the tradition from Kant to Habermas and
Honneth, the domains in which actions can be practiced in a wu-wei-like manner is
virtually unlimited.
Drawing on insights arising from analytic philosophy of mind and action, Chris
Fraser has shown that wu-wei can be understood as what John Searle refers to as ―the
Background‖.36 The Background is a term of art referring to the various tacit
capacities, abilities and know-how an actor always already draws on whenever
performing an action. These unthematized background conditions allow for an action
to be successful while facing real time challenges that could not be solved through
slow acts of premeditation. Classic examples would be the intuitive operation of a
car's transmission or speaking a language fluently. These actions are being performed
without having to calculate which gear is appropriate for which speed or consciously
having to apply the rules of grammar.
Fraser ultimately criticizes wu-wei-based normative accounts of action since they
proclaim to do away with the kind of higher-level deliberation that he rightly
35
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considers fundamental to engaging in moral reasoning and other practices. I agree
with Fraser that it is necessary to account for these forms of intentional deliberation
while I disagree with him in excluding higher order intentional deliberation from the
realm of potentially wu-wei forms of activities. What Fraser's reductivist analysis of
wu-wei understood as nonintentional action fails to see is that reasoning is an action
as well, a thought-action.37 Thought actions also always presuppose a background of
tacit assumptions, including normative assumptions, meanings and associations of
concepts, etc. A contemporary reconstruction of the concept of wu-wei understood as
effortless non-calculative responsiveness (rather than nonintentional action) can thus
also be applied to cognitive thought-acts. In the mentioned story of butcher Ding as
well as other stories, Zhuang Zi emphasizes that the person who knows what he is
doing often engages in thinking before he makes his moves. However, such thinking
does not decide between alternative courses of action by applying rules in judgment
(bian 辩). Rather, as A.C. Graham points out, such a form of attentive thinking is an
intuitive sorting out (lun 論).38 Accordingly, artificial forms of deliberation, which are
nonspontaneous, strenuous and fixated on following predetermined principles and
future goals, are then to be distinguished from those kinds of genuine thought-actions
which are conducted in a skillful, responsive and spontaneous manner with a
heightened attention for and awareness of the specific needs of the evolving present.
Daoism would espouse the latter while dismissing the former practices. Free
intentional deliberation consists in an open encounter with intentional contents.
Searle's assertion that ―intentionality reaches down to the bottom level of the
voluntary actions‖39 thus needs to be extended by adding that spontaneity and
effortlessness receptivity also reaches all the way up to the level of intentionality.40
Only by acknowledging that wu-wei potentially applies to all actions, including
thought-acts, do we get an insight into the scope and impact of Daoist naturalism.
Once we acknowledge that many of our thought contents, as Galan Strawson's puts it,
―just happen‖,41 the question becomes whether we can make any general claims about
how to relate to them responsively. Actors are not simply confronted with neutral,
occurring episodes entering and leaving their field of attention, but stand to their
streams of consciousness in a relationship that Harry Frankfurt aptly characterizes as
one of caring.42 In the process of wu-wei-like action, the actor does not distinguish
between an instrumental value of intermediary goals and an absolute value of the
37
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future, final goal. Rather, as Graham shows, the only imperative of the Daoist critic of
imperatives is ―respond with awareness of what is objectively so.‖43 If an action is
performed in a wu-wei-like manner, the actor does not only, and not even primarily
care for the realization of the goals of his action, but also cares about how well, in the
sense of how attentive, the action leading to such a realization is being performed.
Daoists agree that if an action is carried out well, the actor responds to streams of
inherently interconnected mental and physical events in a focused and contextsensitive manner. He is in a state of acquiescence to the specificity of the task
performed and the context in which it is performed. In other words, he stops to see
these events as unacceptable intruders that need to be sorted out anxiously according
to given rules and reified plans, but as providing occasions or invitations for actions,
actions which are responsive, sensitive and focused.
The implications of conceiving of optimal intentional action as not being one of
an overtaxing, future-directed effort, but one that effortlessly focuses on the demands
of the present, are far reaching. An action, which is not based on the logic of striving
for future goals but on performing a practice well in the here and now, is the most
efficacious form of practice since it does not waste its energy in fruitless
confrontation. This is not to say that wu-wei-like actions could not be executed
quickly. Wu-wei concerns the form rather than the speed in which an action is carried
out. Whether an action is being performed quickly or slowly does not determine
whether it is performed in an absorbed and responsive way. Sitting still, for example
in the context of meditation, can be non-wu-wei-like in involving a lot of effort when
the person meditating forces himself to sit still for ulterior goals. The skilled mastery
of the juggler over his cascades or the engagement in a lively conversation, on the
other hand, might be performed quasi-automatically even if involving quick and
spontaneous responses. Conscious deceleration, be it through eating in a slower pace
or turning to meditation, might further perpetuate the temporal logic of the
instrumental calculus as long as it is performed with too much effort and connected to
a focus on an extrinsic concern. The efficacy of effortless action is not one measured
by calculating future gains against present costs, but one that takes into account how
far the acting individual is in fact in tune with the rhythm of his or her environment
by responding to challenges of that environment as they arise in ever readjusting
forms. Such a process of being ―in tune‖ combines mastery and responsiveness,
engagement and receptivity, order and spontaneity, purpose and disinterestedness.
Effortless action is thus not subject to following a universal set of norms as the
Confucians (or Kantians) would have it. Rather, a person performing actions well
generates singular norms that arise from, and do justice to, the concrete situation
(auto-nomous).
The state of mind that a person is in while exercising noncalculative and
responsive action has been compared to what psychologists have described as ―flow
experience‖. Flowing action provides an antidote to the accelerating, reifying and
disenchanting logic that drives instrumental action. It comes as no surprise that
43
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Zhuang Zi‘s story concerning cook Ding's perfected carving of an ox serves as a
prominent example in Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi's classic Flow: The Psychology of
Optimal Experience in which ‗yu‘ (御) is being translated as ‗flow‘.44 Flow comes
about when human actors are absorbed in the present tasks at hand. The present tasks
at hand are seen as providing living potentials rather than dead means for ulterior
ends. When actors in flow states are confronted by a challenging task, the completion
of this task lets the actor forget the past and the future. Interrupting ordinary
strenuous comportment, an actor undergoing flow experiences also overcomes a
reified sense of self, thereby ―dereifying‖ or liquifying, reenchanting, and
decelerating his relationship to the objects he produces, himself, the act of production
and his fellow human beings. Flow arises out of a balancing act that is in constant
danger of collapsing either into becoming a rote routine or an overtaxing effort. The
overtaxing effort brings forth unnecessary forms of reactions, while the rote routine
lacks the sense of freedom and potential. The art of wu-wei thus consists in
successfully striking and sustaining a balance between extreme effort and passive
rule-following. If an actor is capable of sustaining such a balance, there is a harmony
between his desires and will. In this sense wu-wei-kind of actions are free actions as
they are characterized by Frankfurt: ―a free act is one that a person performs simply
because he wants to perform it. Enjoying freedom of action consists in maintaining
this harmonious accord between what we do and what we want to do.‖45 As different
as the underlying temporality is, the guiding ideal of effortless, attentive actions
provides a surprising overlap with the guiding Western ideal of positive freedom.
Let me end by returning to the legend concerning the origin of the Dao-De-Jing.
According to this legend, the book was written down by Lao Zi through his student as
a form of road toll in order to pass the toll-keeper at the Han pass when moving West.
It is an irony of history that perhaps the first critique of the principle of exchanging
the present for the future was passed down to us based on an operation of exchanging
the written word for the right of passage. Lao Zi, the first critic of the assumption that
we could once and for all fix the living knowledge necessary to traverse the changing
way with timeless principles,46 paid for his final passage by writing down and thus
codifying the idea according to which water defeats the stone. Walter Benjamin,
perhaps the most Daoist member of the Frankfurt school of critical theory, wrote a
brief commentary on Brecht's poetic image of this scene. The commentary stresses
that Lao Zi's friendliness and cheerfulness interrupted the principle of equivalent
exchange by ―rendering a great service as if it were trivial.‖ We might also say, as if
it were non-calculative, effortless and responsive. Lao Zi, Benjamin continues, thus
―places these world-historical days under the motto: ‗All right-just a brief stop‘.‖ It is
the act of an effortless giving and thereby interrupting the journey without leading to
a standstill that is forcefully conjured up in this anecdote. Capturing the spirit and the
44
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specific presenting temporality of effortlessness, Benjamin asks ―and what use would
his wisdom be if he who forgot the valley (which he had just looked on with pleasure
again) when he rounded the next corner did not also forget his anxieties about the
future almost as soon as he felt them?‖47 Critical theory has yet to come to terms with
the radical potential of such seemingly small, spontaneous, effortless, friendly,
forgetful and anxiety-free acts in the midst of precarious times.
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